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Retrospectives 1971: Strategic Organization

The Joint Force and Lessons from 1971
Jonathan P. Klug

ABSTRACT: In 1971 Colonel Duane H. Smith analyzed the unified
command structure, examined an existing proposal for change,
and suggested improvements. He illustrated how this structure
must account for the challenges of the contemporary strategic
environment and balance several tensions, such as effectiveness
versus efficiency, flexibility versus focusing on a specific mission,
and forward-deployed versus home-station forces. Many of Smith’s
insights remain applicable to the unified command structure and
global force management processes today.

S

ince 1946 the Unified Command Plan and its inherent
unified command structure (UCS) have directed how the US
Department of Defense organizes its forces.1 In his 1971
Parameters article, Colonel Duane H. Smith, US Army, evaluated the UCS
by exploring the following questions: “Is the present unified command
structure adequate for ensuring unity of effort of land, sea, and air
forces? Would the peacetime organization require change if the US
went to war? If change is indicated, what should the change be?”2 In his
analysis Smith examined an existing proposal for change and suggested
his own improvements. His approach and many of his recommendations
remain relevant today.
The strategic environment and strategic goals are the basis for each
iteration of the plan, which aims to create an effective and efficient
structure. Additionally this framework provides unity of effort for
cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. Striving for an optimal
organization has resulted in many iterations of the UCS over the decades,
reflecting the dynamic nature of both the strategic environment and
options for advancing national interests. In fact, 10 USC § 161 directs a
review of the Unified Command Plan and its UCS at least every two years.

1971 Analysis

Smith highlighted the US military’s four strategic goals, derived
from then Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s military posture
statement to Congress in March 1971, to be executed through the
specified and unified commands:
• “strategic nuclear retaliation against a nuclear attacker”
1. Edward J. Drea et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–2012 (Washington, DC: Joint
History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2013), iii, https://www
.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Institutional/Command_Plan.pdf.
2. Duane H. Smith, “The Unified Command Structure,” Parameters 1, no. 2 (Fall 1971): 14.
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•
•
•

“defense of the United States”
“peacetime participation of US forces in mutual security
arrangements, including deployment in strategic areas
overseas”
“rapid deployment of mobile forces based in the United States
to conduct operations as directed”3

The unified and specified commands of 1971 were as unique as
their geographic areas or functions. United States Pacific Command
(USPACOM) focused on a single geographic area, which contrasted
sharply with command responsibilities on the other side of the globe: the
Atlantic region had two separate commands—United States European
Command (USEUCOM) and United States Atlantic Command
(USLANTCOM). While USEUCOM was a unified command responsible
for the geographic area, USLANTCOM consisted of naval forces oriented
on a maritime mission. United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM)
was responsible for rapid overseas deployments. The primary mission
of United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was the
defense of the Panama Canal, and United States Alaskan Command
(USALCOM) focused on air defense.
Strategic defensive forces were separate from strategic offensive
forces and resided in United States Continental Air Defense Command
(USCONAD). Three commands controlled strategic offensive forces:
United States Strategic Air Command (USSAC) was a specified
command that contained bombers and land-based missiles, and
USPACOM and USLANTCOM controlled sea-launched missiles. Thus
strategic retaliation to a nuclear attack required the coordination of
three US commands.
After describing the commands Smith examined the 1970 Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel report, which was critical of the UCS. The panel
offered several recommendations, most of which revolved around
creating a layer of three new unified commands. These new commands
would have been functionally oriented and would command the
existing, although reorganized, specified and unified commands.
Strategic Command was the first of the three new unified commands
and would be responsible for all strategic weapons—offensive and
defensive—and strategic targeting. This new organization would have
commanded the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff, USSAC,
USCONAD, and the Navy’s fleet of ballistic missile submarines formerly
belonging to USPACOM and USLANTCOM.
Tactical Command was the second of the recommended new unified
commands and would have required many changes to implement. Tactical
Command would have subsumed the missions of USLANTCOM,
USSTRICOM, and USSOUTHCOM and would have commanded
3. Smith, “Unified Command Structure,” 14.
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the conventional forces of the United States including USEUCOM
and USPACOM. Logistics Command was the third and final unified
command the panel recommended. This organization would have
commanded supply distribution, maintenance, and transportation for
all combat forces. Overall, the panel’s recommendations were sweeping
in nature and met with resistance.
Smith first provided a detailed analysis of the panel’s recommendation
to create a Strategic Command. This recommendation centered on the
ability to retaliate against a strategic attack quickly while maintaining
the readiness of the three legs of the nuclear triad—intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range
bombers. Quick retaliation relied on effective planning and a key
question was: Could the Joint Staff effectively complete centralized
planning for deployment of these weapons?
Similarly the question of readiness focused on whether four separate
unified commands could maintain the readiness of strategic weapons
while effectively executing the Joint Staff’s war plans. Smith argued, “the
concept of a unified command for all strategic forces is sound; that we
have never established one is a consequence of divergent Service views.”4
Smith supported the creation of a new Strategic Command, but
he argued against the proposed Tactical Command. These tactical
forces belonged to six area unified commands, which the Department
of Defense continually rearranged due to new concepts and political
realities. Following an examination of the nature, employment, and
organization of tactical forces, Smith argued, “the panel has gone too
far” with their recommendation for a Tactical Command, as it was
cumbersome and increased the number of headquarters personnel.5
Smith did not investigate the proposal for a Logistics Command due
to the inherent complexities of the organization’s broad and complex
responsibilities, noting that any analysis of such an organization would
be challenging for the same reasons. Furthermore the panel did not
discuss the organization in detail—it only recommended its creation,
which gave Smith little to analyze.
Smith concluded his article with some recommendations. He argued
to disestablish Alaskan Command, disestablish USSOUTHCOM, and
merge USLANTCOM with USEUCOM, with the latter serving as the
former’s naval component commander. Also he proposed USSTRICOM
and United States Middle East/Africa south of the Sahara/South Asia
Command reorganize to become Mobile Command. United States
European Command would have been responsible for the Middle
East, and USPACOM would have been responsible for South Asia.
Thus, Smith’s recommended unified command structure would have
had four commands: Strategic Command, Pacific Command, European
Command, and Mobile Command.
4. Smith, “Unified Command Structure,” 17.
5. Smith, “Unified Command Structure,” 19.
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Still Relevant Today

Smith methodically and fairly evaluated the UCS, analyzed the Blue
Ribbon Panel report, and provided his recommendations. The approach
he used remains relevant today. First, his analysis of strategic goals
captured the essence of long-term US defense objectives, as the 1971
strategic goals detailed above are remarkably like those articulated in the
unclassified description of the 2018 National Military Strateg y:
• “Respond to Threats
• Deter Strategic Attack (and Proliferation of [weapons of mass
destruction])
• Deter Conventional Attack
• Assure Allies and Partners
• Compete Below the Level of Armed Conflict”6
The goals in the 2018 National Military Strateg y explicitly emphasize
deterrence, where Smith’s 1971 strategic goals implicitly included
deterrence—unsurprising given the Cold War era of mutually assured
destruction. Similarly Smith’s strategic goal of “peacetime participation
of US forces in mutual security arrangements, including deployment
in strategic areas overseas” demonstrated the United States needed to
assure allies and partners in peace and war; as indicated above, the 2018
National Military Strateg y also addresses assuring allies and partners.7
And the United States needed access, basing, and overflight in 1971
just as it does today. Notwithstanding differences in national security
vernacular and allowing for implicit aims, Smith began his analysis of
the UCS articulating strategic goals similar to current strategic goals.
Smith identified several important features in creating and
maintaining the UCS including the inherent tensions involved in
designing and operating the commands. Smith effectively captured
the interservice tension between operational-level flexibility and
operational-level effectiveness, noting service interests more than US
national interests drove the UCS and its commands. The Navy preferred
commands based on a geographic area of responsibility, which tended
to preserve flexibility at the expense of the effectiveness of local control.
The Army and the Air Force advocated for commands based on missions
and forces, which were more effective in addressing their particular
function, but such an arrangement diluted the potential combat power
that could respond to an actual crisis.8
6. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Description of the National Military Strategy 2018 (Washington, DC:
Office of Primary Responsibility: Strategy Development Division, Office of the CJCS, 2019),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military
_Strategy_Description.pdf.
7. Smith, “Unified Command Structure,” 14.
8. Ronald H. Cole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993 (Washington, DC:
Joint History Office, Office of the CJCS, 1995), 11–12, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2
/a313508.pdf.
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The Navy approach allowed the Pacific Fleet to operate together
more effectively. If the UCS instead called for two or more functional
commands within the Pacific area, each command would have had its
own naval component. Dividing the Pacific Fleet in this manner would
have diminished its combat power and effectiveness, not to mention
exposing the smaller naval elements to defeat in detail. These tensions
remain to some degree as service realities and perspectives are alive
and well.
The ability of the UCS and the specified and unified commands to
smoothly transition between peace and war was a vital concern in 1971.
Likewise, the 2018 NMS calls for quickly and effectively shifting from
peace to war. Contemporary global security challenges demonstrate the
need for a more detailed framework to understand this complex strategic
environment and operate within it. In response, the 2018 Joint Concept
for Integrated Campaigning proposed a competition continuum outlining
how the US military had roles in “cooperation, competition, and armed
conflict.”9 A year later, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum,
refined this continuum.10
Although seen through the lens of the bipolar international state
system, Smith’s 1971 analysis reflected an understanding of what was
necessary for success throughout what we would today refer to as
the competition continuum. Major unified commands then and now
continually conduct peacetime cooperation with allies and partners,
compete with other major powers, transition smoothly to and from
armed conflict, and succeed in armed conflict.
The balance between mobile and area commands is another
recurring tension Smith examined that has implications today. Area
commands and their forward-deployed forces are more expensive to
maintain, are exposed to potential attacks, and can lead to international
tension. But the presence of forward-deployed forces can also reassure
allies and have diplomatic and deterrent effects. Keeping military forces
in US territory has advantages as well; maintaining force readiness is
generally more cost effective and is far less likely to create tensions with
potential adversaries.
Smith recommended an approach that used both forward-deployed
forces and forces in the continental United States. A crucial part of
his recommendation was a new Mobile Command responsible for
contingencies occurring outside the USPACOM and USEUCOM areas
of responsibility. (Smith did not mention continually rotating units to
maintain forward-deployed forces, such as in South Korea or Poland.
These heel-to-toe rotations impair unit readiness and require substantial
institutional efforts to prepare, rotate, and recover.)
The Mobile Command Smith envisioned would have had immense
responsibilities, including five major tasks broad in scope and diversity:
9. US Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office (GPO), March 16, 2018), 12.
10. DoD, Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 (Washington, DC: US GPO, 2019).
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deploy forces under a mobile headquarters, defend the United States
from conventional attacks, provide military assistance outside of the areas
of responsibility of USEUCOM and USPACOM, bear responsibility
for Joint training and doctrine, and augment other unified commands
as needed. Additionally, warfighting responsibilities potentially would
have involved an immense span of control. Collectively, these five tasks
would certainly have overwhelmed one headquarters whether during
the Cold War or in a large-scale conflict today.
The tasks Smith proposed for the Mobile Command, comprehensive
then, have only grown in size and scope in the intervening 50 years,
so much so that several organizations are required to address them.
Collectively today’s combatant commands have global responsibility.
They also provide military assistance: several combatant commands,
principally United States Northern Command, defend the United States
from conventional attacks.
Today’s solutions to Joint planning, capability development, force
development, readiness, and doctrine are also much more involved than
Smith could have foreseen. The nature of today’s tasks and the global
and multifunctional nature of contemporary warfighting require today’s
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as the global integrator
of these functions using the Joint Strategic Planning System, which
includes the global force management (GFM) process. Smith’s call for
the Mobile Command to support the other unified commands was
an early indicator of the requirements behind the GFM. The GFM
integrates “readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and
assessment.”11 Within GFM, the dynamic force employment process
allows combatant commands to “more flexibly use ready forces to shape
proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to
respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.”12
Finally, dynamic force employment as a process speaks to the
challenge of expanding requirements and diminishing resources. Two
developments after Smith’s article was published highlighted these
requirements and resources challenges—the establishment of the
all-volunteer force in 1973 and the reduction of forces after the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Smith’s recommendations that USPACOM and USEUCOM control
all conventional forces also reflect timeless questions concerning
forward-deployed forces, pre-positioned equipment, and sufficient
airlift and sealift capacities. For example, concerns have recently been
raised regarding the size and state of US airlift and sealift capabilities as

11. “Global Force Management,” The Lightning Press, https://www.thelightningpress.com
/global-force-management-gfm/.
12. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense, January 19, 2018).
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the latter has shown to be insufficient and of questionable readiness.13
These capabilities are elements of the broader processes by which the
Department of Defense considers certain activities such as establishing
a forward element of the Army V Corps in Poland.14
Smith’s analysis and recommendations foreshadowed the need for
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 and today’s unified command structure. The law restructured the
Department of Defense and the Joint Force, streamlining the chain of
command in an effort to ensure effective Joint operations. Accordingly,
the legislation addressed some of the issues highlighted by the Blue
Ribbon Panel and by Smith. Smith’s recommendations also pointed
toward today’s UCS, which has seven geographic combatant commands,
four functional combatant commands, and the Defense Logistics
Agency. For example, he advocated for the Strategic Command and
what later became the Defense Logistics Agency.
There were several things Smith did not foresee, such as the need for
a unified transportation command and the proliferation of area unified
commands to encompass the entire globe. Perhaps more importantly
Smith did not foresee the immense changes in the space and cyber
domains that would emerge by 2020. Even science fiction of the day,
such as Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 masterpiece 2001: A Space Odyssey and its
antagonist HAL, the spaceship’s computer, only hinted at the challenges
space, cyber, and artificial intelligence would come to present. These
challenges were driving factors for the global integration concept,
intended to win future wars in which belligerents vie for superiority in
the cyber, space, air, sea, and land domains across the globe. Winning
such wars requires maximizing effectiveness across the Joint functions.

Conclusion

For its time, Smith’s article was accurate and insightful,
demonstrating the kind of analysis necessary for periodic reviews of
the unified command structure. He understood such a study had to
balance multiple tensions including effectiveness versus efficiency,
service preferences for flexibility versus a focus on a specific mission,
forward-deployed versus home-station forces and equipment, and the
amount and type of airlift and sealift capabilities needed versus their
cost. Some of Smith’s more extensive recommendations were prescient.
The Department of Defense would later consolidate strategic attack
and defense forces under one unified command and create a unified
command for logistics.
Smith’s article is an exemplar of the importance of reading old
works. His fellow US Army War College faculty member Colonel John
13. David B. Larter, “The US Army Is Preparing to Fight in Europe, but Can It Even Get
There?” Defense News, October 8, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/10/08/the
-army-is-preparing-to-fight-in-europe-but-can-it-even-get-there/.
14. John Vandiver, “Army’s V Corps, with a Long History in Europe, Is Back in Action,” Stars
and Stripes, October 16, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/army-s-v-corps-with-a-long-history
-in-europe-is-back-in-action-1.648804.
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“Jack” McCuen’s 1966 book, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, remains
an essential part of any counterinsurgency reading list.15 McCuen’s book
and personal efforts were invaluable in crafting the counterinsurgency
doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan, which came full circle to the 1960s
challenge of insurgency. Similarly, Smith’s efforts have come full circle
to the broader questions on how to organize US military forces at the
strategic level. Both officers based their writing on Korean War and
Vietnam War experiences. They gained their wisdom through study
and practice—the old-fashioned way; in short, they earned it. Today’s
readers can profit from their efforts.

15. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (1966; repr., St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer
Publishing, 2005).

